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Abstract  
 Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably 
enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the 
mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an 
observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation 
of the agent’s observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor 
theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, 
many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition 
and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we express 
our skepticism about the motor theory of social cognition.  
 
 
 Motor theories of human cognition are ubiquitous. Our topic is the motor theory of 
social cognition. The remarkable discovery of so-called “mirror neurons” (MNs) in the ventral 
pre-motor cortex (area F5) of macaque monkeys [1-3] and the discovery of the mirror system 
in humans [4-7] have raised the prospects of a “motor theory of social cognition”, whose goal 
is to derive human social cognition from human motor cognition [8-12]. MNs are sensori-
motor neurons that fire both when a monkey executes certain kinds of actions and when the 
monkey perceives the same actions being performed by another [1-3]. By automatically 
matching the agent’s observed movements onto her own motor repertoire without executing 
them, the firing of MNs in the observer’s brain simulates the agent’s observed movements and 
thereby contributes to the understanding of the perceived action [1-3]. Thus, MNs supply 
motor, not purely perceptual, representations of actions. Because they are located in the pre-
motor cortex, MNs should not fire in an observer’s brain unless the represented action was 
executable, i.e., consistent with the rules of the motor system [13-14]. We therefore think that 
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one important function of MNs might be to enhance learning technical skills by allowing 
motor imitation [2, 15] (but see Box 1). However, we are skeptical about the view that MNs 
constitute the fundamental neural basis of human social cognition. This paper is our way of 
explaining why.  
 
1. Human social cognition and mindreading  
 In a weak sense, human social cognition encompasses all cognitive processes relevant 
to the perception and understanding of conspecifics [16]. So it includes, but it is not restricted 
to, the cognitive processes involved in the understanding of perceived actions performed by 
conspecifics. It is widely recognized that what is distinctive of human social cognition is the 
human mindreading ability to understand, not just the observable behavior of one’s 
conspecifics, but also one’s own mind (which we shall ignore here) and especially the minds 
of others [17-20]. Thanks to their mindreading ability, healthy human adults readily explain 
and predict human actions by representing and attributing to human agents a whole battery of 
internal unobservable mental states such as goals, intentions, emotions, perceptions, desires, 
beliefs, many of which are far removed from any observable behavior [21]. It is also 
intuitively clear that there is a gap between full-blown human mindreading and the 
psychological understanding of perceived actions afforded by MNs. Thus, the challenge faced 
by motor theorists of social cognition is to bridge this gap.  
 Faced with this challenge, the strategy favored by motor theorists of social cognition is 
to tinker with the concept of motor simulation, as suggested by simulation theorists of 
mindreading [8, 10-12, 22-23]. We disapprove this strategy because it relaxes the fundamental 
link between simulation and the requirements of the motor system, which we take very 
seriously. The firing of MNs is a social cognitive process only in a very weak sense. When 
MNs fire in the brain of a monkey during action execution, the discharge is not a social 
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cognitive process at all. When MNs fire in the brain of a monkey watching another grasp a 
fruit, the discharge is a weakly social process: the two monkeys are not involved in any kind 
of non-verbal intentional communication. The agent intends to grasp a fruit, not to impart 
some information to his conspecific. Nor does the observer’s understanding of the action 
require him to understand the agent’s communicative intention (because the agent has none).   
 One way to question the motor theory of social cognition would be to challenge it to 
account for the human capacity to read one’s own mind or to ascribe false beliefs to others — 
something that healthy human adults do all the time without effort. But this is not what we 
shall do. Instead, we shall grant that simulating an agent’s movements may be sufficient for 
understanding his motor intention, but we shall argue that it is not sufficient for understanding 
the agent’s prior intentions, his social intentions and his communicative intentions. Then, we 
shall argue that motor simulation might not even be necessary for understanding all perceived 
actions. Finally, we shall argue that a significant part of human social cognition is comprised 
of a “perceptual social” system whose neural basis has perceptual but no motor properties [15, 
24].  
 
2. Motor simulation, motor intentions and prior intentions  
 Evidence from brain imaging in healthy adults and autistic individuals suggests that 
reasoning about beliefs and representing goals and intentions are subserved by different brain 
areas [19-20]. Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that the former is a later 
and more costly accomplishment than the latter [17-18, 25]. An action is a goal-directed 
sequence of bodily movements initiated and monitored by what we shall call a “motor 
intention”. Understanding a perceived action requires at least representing the agent’s motor 
intention. Although human adults readily explain actions by representing agents’ (true or 
false) beliefs, it is possible, by relying on one’s own current perception of the world, to 
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represent the goal of a perceived action or the agent’s motor intention without representing an 
agent’s (true) beliefs. By simulating the agent’s perceived movements, the observer may 
represent the agent’s motor intention.  
 Indeed, before they can reason about beliefs, young children can represent goals and 
intentions [19-20]. After having been habituated to seeing a reach-and-grasp hand movement, 
five- to eight month-old infants look longer when the target of the prehension movement 
changes than when the path of the hand movement changes [26]. However, when grasping by 
a human hand is replaced by the motion of an artefact, e.g., a metal claw, the pattern of 
preference elicited by seeing the movement of the human hand disappears [26]. This is 
compatible with the hypothesis that infants represent the goal of the action and the agent’s 
motor intention by matching the observed hand movement onto their own motor repertoire, 
i.e., by motor simulation.  
 Philosophers, however, have long emphasized the distinction between basic actions 
and non-basic actions: for example, the non-basic action of turning on the light can be 
performed by the basic action of pressing a switch. They also make the correlative distinction 
between motor intentions (or “intentions in action”) and “prior” intentions whose goals are 
more remote [27-28]. A motor intention is an intention to execute a basic action. Given one’s 
prior intention to execute the non-basic action of turning on the light, one forms the motor 
intention to perform the basic action of e.g., pressing the switch with one’s right index finger. 
Perceiving the basic action of pressing the switch with the right index finger automatically 
causes the observer to entertain the very motor representation that guides the agent’s 
execution of the action. By executing the basic action, the agent also performs the non-basic 
action of turning on the light. The agent’s basic action is controlled by his motor intention. 
His non-basic action is controlled by his prior intention. We surmise that by simulating the 
agent’s perceived movement of pressing the switch with his right index finger, an observer 
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will understand the agent’s motor intention to execute the basic action, not his prior intention 
to execute the non-basic action.  
 
3. Motor simulation and understanding social intentions  
 Not all human actions are directed towards inanimate targets. Some are directed 
towards conspecifics. In addition to the distinction between motor intentions and prior 
intentions, an agent’s non-social intentions must be distinguished from his social intentions, 
i.e., his intentions to act on conspecifics, who, unlike inanimate targets of action, can act back. 
Thus, a social intention is an intention to affect a conspecific’s behavior. Since humans often 
act out of their mental representations, a social intention may also be an intention to modify a 
conspecific’s mental representations. The question is: could an observer represent an agent’s 
social intention by simulating the agent’s observed movements? As the following little 
thought-experiment will show, it is unlikely that what enables an observer to represent an 
agent’s social intention is the observer’s ability to match an agent’s perceived movements 
onto her own motor repertoire.  
 Consider Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. The former is a renowned surgeon who performs 
appendectomies on his anesthestized patients. The latter is a dangerous sadist who performs 
exactly the same hand movements on his non-anesthestized victims. As it turns out, Mr Hyde 
is Dr Jekyll. Suppose that Dr Watson witnesses both Dr Jekyll’s and Mr Hyde’s actions. Upon 
perceiving Dr Jekyll alias Mr Hyde execute twice the same motor sequence whereby he 
grasps his scalpel and applies it to the same bodily part of two different persons, presumably 
the very same MNs produce the same discharge in Dr Watson’s brain. Dr Jekyll’s motor 
intention is the same as Mr Hyde’s. However, Dr Jekyll’s social intention clearly differs from 
Mr Hyde’s: whereas Dr Jekyll intends to improve his patient’s medical condition, Mr Hyde 
intends to derive pleasure from his victim’s agony. By matching them onto her own 
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repertoire, an observer simulates the agent’s movements. Simulating the agent’s movements 
may allow an observer to represent the agent’s motor intention. We surmise that it will not 
allow her to represent the agent’s social intention.  
 
4. Motor simulation and understanding communicative intentions  
 MNs were first discovered in the context of motor and perceptual tasks that had a very 
weak social content, if any. As recognized by philosophers, psychologists and linguists 
studying pragmatics, especially complex among a human agent’s social intentions are his 
(reflexive or self-referential) communicative intentions. A communicative intention is an 
intention to impart information by virtue of its own recognition by the addressee [29-30]. Jill 
may have the social intention to cause Bill to believe that his wife is unfaithful to him without 
Bill’s recognizing Jill’s social intention. If so, then Jill’s social intention is not a 
communicative intention. But Jill cannot have the communicative intention to cause Bill to 
acquire the same belief without Bill’s recognizing Jill’s communicative intention.  
 Now, consider Jill’s non-verbal communicative intention whereby she intends to 
convey to John her desire to leave the party by ostensively pointing her index finger onto her 
wrist-watch in front of John. John thereby acquires the belief that Jill wants to leave the party 
by recognizing her communicative intention. Jill may, however, execute the very same 
ostensive bodily movement if she wants John to believe instead that her watch is inaccurate. 
Simulating Jill’s movement of her right index finger towards her left wrist will allow John to 
represent Jill’s motor intention. But it will not allow him to distinguish between Jill’s two 
communicative intentions.  
 
5. Why motor simulation may not be necessary for understanding all perceived actions  
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 Simulating an agent’s observed movements is not sufficient for representing either an 
agent’s prior intention or his social intention. Is it necessary? Evidence from developmental 
psychology suggests that it is not. Upon perceiving their relative motions, 6 month old infants 
automatically ascribe goals to moving geometrical stimuli [31-32]. The question is: why do 
they ascribe goals to moving geometrical stimuli, not to a metal claw moving towards a 
standing inanimate target [26]?  
 It has long been known that perceiving the relative motions of geometrical stimuli 
(e.g., circles and triangles) with no human or animal aspect may prompt normal adults to 
ascribe to the moving stimuli emotions and social intentions that they describe using 
intentional verbs such “chase”, “corner”, “attack”, “caress” or “comfort” [33-34]. There is 
also evidence that three to four year old toddlers respond like adults to the perception of 
Heider and Simmel type of stimuli [35]. Recently, when showed a triangle and a square 
whose motions were automatically seen respectively as “helping” and as “hindering” a circle 
move up a slope, 12 month old infants exhibited a clear preference for the former over the 
latter [36].  
 Seeing the biological movement of a human hand reach and grasp a target prompts a 
human observer to represent the agent’s motor intention by automatically matching the 
perceived movement onto her own motor repertoire [26]. Given the asymmetry between a 
moving human hand and its inanimate target, perceiving the action elicits the attribution of a 
motor intention, not of a social intention, to the agent. By contrast, geometrical stimuli form a 
homogeneous class of entities. Seeing geometrical stimuli move in relation to one another 
causes in humans a “perceptual social illusion”, i.e., an illusion of social interactions guided 
by social intentions [33-36]. But given that the motion of geometrical stimuli is non-
biological, it follows that the process whereby social intentions are represented and ascribed 
cannot be by matching the observed motions onto one’s own motor repertoire, i.e., by 
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simulation in the narrow sense. Clearly, the process whereby geometrical stimuli are ascribed 
social intentions cannot be motor simulation.  
 Many social interactions are actions at a distance that involve an agent’s head- and 
eye-movements towards or away from, but no direct bodily contact with, a conspecific. On 
the one hand, by the age of 7 months, human infants expect human interactions, unlike causal 
relations between inanimate objects, not to involve bodily contact [37]. On the other hand, 
much evidence from single cell recordings in the brain of macaque monkeys and from brain 
imaging in human adults suggests the existence of a purely perceptual system of “social 
perception” [15, 24] that can be tricked by perceptual illusions (the hallmark of perceptual 
systems). It involves the cooperation between at least three brain areas: the Superior Temporal 
Sulcus (STS), the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex [15, 19, 24, 34, 38-41]. Unlike 
neurons in F5 and in the inferior parietal lobule, which fire in response to the perception of 
object-oriented actions, many neurons in STS respond to the perception of others’ actions 
directed towards conspecifics: they lack motor properties [2, 42] and they do not respond to 
the perception of one’s own movements [43-44].  
 There is a good reason why the perceptual response to a perceived action directed 
towards a conspecific would lack motor properties. The inanimate target of an object-oriented 
action does not act. As a result, the only movements which an observer can automatically 
match onto his own motor repertoire are the agent’s. If, however, the target of a perceived 
action is a conspecific, then he or she will react. But then, the observer will simply be unable 
to automatically and simultaneously match onto his own motor repertoire the perceived 
movements of both agents. Only if he intentionally neglects one of the agent’s observed 
movements will the observer be able to simulate the other’s movements. This may be a case 
of motor simulation, but it is an intentional, not an automatic, process.  
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Conclusion 
 The mirror system is the mechanism whereby an observer understands a perceived 
action by simulating, without executing, the agent’s observed movements. The motor 
properties of the mirror system are well designed for representing an agent’s motor intention 
involved in an object-oriented action, not for representing an agent’s social intention, let alone 
his communicative intention. The mirror system does not seem well designed for promoting 
fast responses to the perception of social actions directed towards conspecifics. For example, 
in response to the perception of a threat, it may be adaptive to flee, not to simulate the 
threatening agent’s observed movements. Evidence from single cell recordings in the monkey 
STS shows that observing many actions towards conspecifics prompts purely perceptual 
responses without motor properties. Important for future research are questions relevant to the 
assessment of the scope of the primate system for pure “social perception”: for example, 
would a male monkey respond to the perception of a female’s behavioral response to his own 
courting behavior by matching her observed movements? We predict that it would not.  
 
Box 1. Mental simulation: a hybrid concept   
 Mental simulation, of which motor simulation is an instance, is a hybrid concept: it 
involves at least two separable ingredients. One idea is that a cognitive mechanism may be 
used “off-line”. For example, it has been suggested [45] that in visual imagery, the human 
visual system is used off-line: instead of taking retinal inputs, it receives inputs from memory. 
Instead of producing a visual percept, it produces a mental visual image. Thus, visual imagery 
consists in simulating visual perception or, as Goldman and Gallese [12] put it, “in pretending 
to see” (p. 497).  
 The other idea is that mental simulation is the cognitive basis of imitation. A natural 
assumption is that the firing of MNs is the neural basis of motor imitation. MNs have been 
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discovered in the brain of macaque monkeys. Do they imitate? Until recently, the evidence 
seemed negative [46]. But there is intriguing new positive evidence [47]. Interestingly, motor 
theorists of social cognition have taken two different, if not irreconcilable, positions on 
imitation. On the one hand, Gallese and Goldman [12] have strongly denied that a function of 
MNs is “to promote learning by imitation” (p. 495-6). On the other hand, on behalf of the 
simulation theory (ST) of mindreading, they have stressed the importance of imitation in tasks 
of third-person mindreading: “ST depicts mindreading as incorporating an attempt to 
replicate, mimic, or impersonate the mental life of the target agent” (p. 497).  
 The main problem with imitation is that it is a folk psychological concept whose 
boundaries are presently too ill-defined for scientific purposes. Newborn babies, who 
reproduce facial movements of lip and tongue protrusion, are said to imitate [48]. And so are 
18 month old toddlers, who have been shown to be able to produce a correct version of an 
action of which they have observed an aborted version [49]. Does imitation reduce to 
copying? Or does imitation allow creative interpretation? Unless this ambiguity is resolved, it 
is hard to evaluate Meltzoff and Decety’s claim that “motor imitation” is “the missing link” 
between MNs and “theory of mind” [50]. If imitation requires copying, then, unlike 
observable behavior, beliefs cannot be imitated for they cannot be copied. If imitation is not 
restricted to copying and if creative interpretation is allowed as part of imitation, then perhaps 
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